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Abstract Using a large panel from 46 countries over 20 years, we find that non-U.S. firms issue 
corporate bonds more frequently and at lower offering yields following an equity cross-listing 
on a U.S. exchange. Firms issue more bonds through public offerings instead of private 
placements and in foreign markets rather than at home, in both cases at significantly lower 
yields. Moreover, the debt-related benefits are concentrated among firms domiciled in countries 
with less private benefits of control, efficient debt enforcement, and developed bond markets, 
suggesting that equity cross-listings cannot completely offset the impact of weak home country 
institutions. The results support the notion that the monitoring, transparency, and visibility 
benefits brought about by equity cross-listings on U.S. exchanges are valuable to bond investors. 
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1 Introduction 
Does cross-listing equity shares in the United States facilitate non-U.S. firms’ access to 
more and cheaper bond financing? While debt markets have traditionally been the main source 
of external capital (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995; Henderson et al. 2006), extant literature 
focused on the costs and benefits of equity cross-listing from a shareholders’ perspective 
(Karolyi 1998, 2006). The argument goes that firms domiciled in countries with weak minority 
shareholder protection, poor information environments, limited availability of equity capital, 
and segmented markets can overcome these shortfalls by subjecting themselves to U.S. 
securities regulation and oversight (Coffee 1999; Stulz 1999). 1  While equity effects are 
important and ultimately serve to justify a firm’s cross-listing decision, there is only limited 
evidence on the bond market implications of U.S. equity cross-listings (e.g., Miller and 
Puthenpurackal 2002; Lins et al. 2005; Qi et al. 2010).2 
The equity benefits of cross-listings draw on the comparative advantages of both the deep 
and liquid U.S. capital markets and the U.S. judicial system with its more transparent 
disclosures, investor protection, and effective monitoring. These characteristics, in principle, 
should also benefit the bondholders of the firm as they likely facilitate access to secondary bond 
markets with higher liquidity and better information, increase the transparency of the firm, and 
allow for better monitoring and enforcement of bond contracts. In return, investors should be 
more willing to participate in the bond issues of cross-listed firms and reduce their price 
                                                 
1  Prior evidence suggests that firms cross-listing shares on a U.S. exchange raise equity capital more frequently 
(e.g., Reese and Weisbach 2002), obtain higher equity valuations (e.g., Foerster and Karolyi 1999; Doidge et 
al. 2004), reduce the cost of equity capital (e.g., Errunza and Miller 2000; Hail and Leuz 2009), improve 
liquidity (e.g., Baruch et al. 2007) and the information environment (e.g., Lang et al. 2003), and expand their 
investor base (e.g., Ammer et al. 2012; King and Segal 2009). 
2  We refer to a foreign firm’s U.S. cross-listed equity as “ADR,” regardless of whether it is an exchange-listed 
American Depositary Receipt (Level II or III), a direct listing (e.g., for Canadian firms), a globally or New 
York registered share, a share traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) markets (the OTC Bulletin Board and 
Pink Sheets), or a private placement under Rule 144A. 
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protection against credit risk, thereby lowering the borrowing costs of these firms (Hart 1995). 
However, the realization of bond financing benefits after firms cross list their shares in 
the U.S. is far from certain. First, the effectiveness of debt enforcement and the level of creditor 
protection in the country of domicile are important factors that likely affect the availability and 
terms of debt capital. The physical location of firms’ assets that could serve as collateral 
typically determines the legal procedures in case of default and the applicability of bankruptcy 
laws (La Porta et al. 1997; Qian and Strahan 2007). Second, growth opportunities associated 
with equity cross-listings increase lenders’ agency costs because of controlling shareholders’ 
tendency to opportunistically select investment projects that maximize shareholder value rather 
than total firm value. Even though the disclosure requirements from filings with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) potentially mitigate these agency conflicts, they 
might not offset them completely. Third, debt-related benefits from equity cross-listings likely 
vary across different types of debt. For public bond offerings, which are arm’s length 
transactions, or bond offerings outside the firm’s home market, lenders might rely more on 
country-level governance institutions for protection, enforcement, and disclosure (Bharath et al. 
2008; Florou and Kosi 2015), and hence should obtain higher benefits from the certification 
role of U.S. equity cross-listings. In contrast, because lenders in private bond placements or in 
the firm’s home market might have privileged access to information, they have incentives to 
closely monitor the borrower because of their greater exposure and to use multiple debt 
contractual levers (not just interest rates) to protect the value of their claims (Gigler et al. 2009). 
To examine these issues, we construct a large international panel comprising of more than 
24,000 non-U.S. firms from 46 countries over the years 1992 to 2012. About 11 percent of the 
yearly observations are from firms with a U.S. equity cross-listing and 19 percent from firms 
that issue bonds. We begin with an analysis of the impact of equity cross-listings on firms’ use 
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of bond markets and the financing costs of issuing bonds. We find that non-U.S. firms are more 
likely to issue bonds after cross-listing their equity on a U.S. stock exchange (NYSE, Nasdaq, 
and Amex). The propensity to issue bonds increases by about 75 basis points. At the same time, 
the bond offering yields are, on average, lower by 38 basis points compared to the period before 
the exchange cross-listing and the benchmark sample of firms without a U.S. cross-listing. This 
estimate translates into yearly cost savings on the order of US$ 1 million per firm, based on the 
mean bond size of US$ 252 million. The results are present both in the period before and, to a 
lesser degree, after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, which arguably has shifted the cost-
benefit tradeoffs faced by firms when deciding to cross-list their equity in the U.S. (Doidge et 
al. 2009; 2010). Firms with U.S. private equity placements or trading in the OTC markets also 
exhibit higher propensities to issue bonds, but only in certain comparisons, and with limited, if 
any, benefits in the form of lower issuing yields. The results are robust to controlling for a large 
set of bond characteristics, firm attributes, macroeconomic factors, country, industry, and year 
fixed effects, as well as the endogenous nature of the firms’ cross-listing decision. 
Next, we explore factors that help explain why bond markets become more attractive after 
equity cross-listings. We show that firms with a U.S. exchange-listing start issuing more public 
bonds and bonds outside their home market, and do so at lower offering yields. The propensity 
to issue public (foreign) bonds increases by about 70 (189) basis points, and the average yield 
decreases by 41 (53) basis points. At the same time, we do not find changes in the issuance 
activity of private bonds, nor their offering yields, while there is evidence of fewer bonds issued 
domestically (at slightly lower yields). The findings suggest that the information environment 
of the firm and/or the lenders’ monitoring capabilities improve after a U.S. equity cross-listing 
(e.g., Lang et al. 2003), and that these changes primarily benefit bondholders typically facing 
higher agency problems (i.e., without inside access to the firm or in foreign markets). The 
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benefits are concentrated for exchange-listings relative to OTC listings or private placements, 
consistent with the notion that listing on a U.S. exchange offers, by far, the strongest 
improvements in terms of transparency and monitoring. We find no evidence of changes in the 
equity market and only a slight increase in the issuing activity (but not the spreads) of syndicated 
loans. 
Finally, we examine how the bond-market benefits of U.S. equity cross-listings vary by 
characteristics of the firm’s country of domicile. The bonding hypothesis stipulates that equity 
investors in firms from countries with weak institutions should benefit the most from a U.S. 
exchange listing (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004; Hail and Leuz 2009). Contrary to this argument, we 
find that firms domiciled in countries with small private benefits of control issue more bonds at 
lower yields after U.S. exchange listings. The results suggest that strengthening the position of 
shareholders does not necessarily improve the position of the debt holders (Qi et al. 2011). They 
also point to the existence of liquidity and visibility benefits in the bond market that go along 
with a U.S. exchange cross-listing (e.g., Foerster and Karolyi 1999; Reese and Weisbach 2002; 
Qi et al. 2010). We further find a higher bond issuing activity at lower offering yields for firms 
domiciled in countries with a track record of efficient debt enforcement and more developed 
bond markets (measured as percentage of GDP). In sum, these results underscore the importance 
of local institutions, namely those that protect creditors’ rights, for the certification role of U.S. 
equity cross-listings in the bond market. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our focus is the effect of an 
equity cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange on non-U.S. firms’ bond issuance activity. The 
comprehensive sample allows us to provide evidence on the incidence and location of bond 
offerings, the types of bonds issued, and the ensuing issuance costs for firms from more than 40 
countries over a period of 20 years. Most prior literature has focused on a specific aspect of the 
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ADR market, like the offering yields of Yankee bonds issued by firms with U.S. equity cross-
listings (Miller and Puthenpurackal 2002), the issuance of equity instead of debt (Reese and 
Weisbach 2002), or the use of cross-listings to relax capital constraints and improve the overall 
cash flow sensitivity (Lins et al. 2005). Khurana et al. (2008) investigate whether cross-listed 
firms’ improved access to external funds contributes to higher growth prospects. They 
document more debt issues, but do not distinguish between the type of debt, the domicile of the 
issuer (or the issue), and do not control for debt characteristics. Our evidence that equity cross-
listings are related to more public bond offerings in markets outside the firm’s country of 
domicile and lower offering yields adds to this stream of literature and complements the findings 
on the equity-market benefits of U.S. cross-listings. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on factors that mitigate agency conflicts between 
firms and their bondholders. We show that the improved firm transparency and/or the better 
monitoring capabilities that go along with an equity cross-listing on a U.S. exchange, but not 
with an OTC listing or a private placement, help reduce information asymmetries. They do so 
primarily for bond contracts that do not allow for private monitoring and information collection 
and for bond investors who are not familiar with local circumstances. These findings are in line 
with Bharath et al. (2008) or Florou and Kosi (2015) that show firms’ preference for public over 
private debt when accounting quality improves. The finding of more bonds issued abroad at 
lower cost is also consistent with U.S. equity cross-listings improving the visibility of the firm 
(Merton 1987), not just in the equity market, but also in the bond market. 
Third, we contribute to the literature on the cross-country determinants of debt contracting 
(e.g., Francis et al. 2005; Qi et al. 2010; Fan et al. 2012). We find that the debt-market benefits 
of U.S. equity cross-listings are concentrated in countries with developed debt markets, efficient 
debt enforcement, and low private benefits of controlling insiders. The results indicate that 
 6
bonding to U.S. market regulation and oversight (e.g., Coffee 1999; Stulz 1999) cannot 
completely offset the impact of weak home-country institutions when it comes to debt financing. 
This finding is consistent with the fact that the physical location of firms’ assets and the legal 
procedures in case of default play a preeminent role for bondholders, in line with Qian and 
Strahan (2007)’s results for syndicated loans. 
Section 2 contains the hypothesis development. In Section 3, we discuss the research 
design and describe the sample. Section 4 presents the main analysis on the changes to the 
propensity and the cost of issuing bonds following a U.S. equity cross-listing. In Section 5, we 
distinguish between different types of bonds and vary the analyses conditional on the issuing 
firm’s country of domicile. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Hypothesis development 
The main theories underlying the equity cross-listing decision are the bonding and 
information hypothesis (Stulz 1999; Coffee 1999, 2002) as well as the liquidity and visibility 
hypothesis (Stulz 1981; Merton 1987).3 The bonding and information hypothesis proposes that 
firms cross-list equity in the U.S. to credibly signal their commitment to protect minority 
interests and provide higher quality disclosures. It builds on the comparative advantages of the 
U.S. judicial and regulatory system with its superior disclosure regime and greater scrutiny from 
regulators, market intermediaries, and investors. The liquidity and visibility hypothesis argues 
that firms cross list to access the more liquid and efficient U.S. capital markets and increase 
their visibility among U.S. investors.4 
                                                 
3  Empirical work in the equity market provides support for both theories (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004; King and 
Segal 2009). 
4  In both cases, access to external (equity or debt) capital is a primary motivation for cross-listing. In line with 
this argument, Pagano et al. (2002) show that U.S. exchanges are attractive for (European) high-tech and 
export-oriented companies that use the equity cross-listing to fund their growth and foreign sales expansion. 
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The bonding and information argument should also apply to bond financing. Stringent 
disclosure and listing requirements for foreign registrants decrease bond investors’ information 
acquisition and monitoring costs. They lower information asymmetries before investing, and 
allow corporate outsiders to detect credit problems in a timelier manner during the holding 
period. For instance, through the Form 20-F filing provisions that apply to an exchange-listing 
(but not a listing in the OTC markets or a private equity placement) bond investors gain access 
to details about prior and existing bonds and syndicated loan contracts. Moreover, equity cross-
listings allow bondholders to pursue legal actions against borrowers through the mechanisms of 
the U.S. judicial system, not available to them or available only at a higher cost in the firm’s 
country of domicile (e.g., class action lawsuits). A cross-listing in the U.S. likely increases the 
scrutiny from market participants, financial intermediaries, and regulators. Intermediaries that 
have significant reputational capital at stake (e.g., international audit firms, rating agencies, or 
underwriters) will put more pressure on managers and controlling shareholders, thereby limiting 
their ability to expropriate resources from bondholders though actions like overinvestment, 
fraud, or strategic defaults. Overall, a credible commitment to more transparency and market 
scrutiny stemming from an equity exchange-listing in the U.S. should facilitate access to bond 
markets and reduce credit risk premiums required by bond investors (Hart 1995). 
The liquidity and visibility argument yields similar predictions. Compared to international 
markets, the liquidity of the U.S. market for corporate bonds is significantly higher, mainly due 
to the existence of large and competitive underwriters, sophisticated debt investors, powerful 
information intermediaries, and low transaction costs. Higher liquidity, in turn, lowers the cost 
of debt (e.g., Chen et al. 2007). In addition, having shares traded in the U.S. helps non-U.S. 
borrowers overcome investors’ lack of familiarity and potentially attracts a larger set of foreign 
investors (Merton 1987). These forces should increase the demand for bonds from firms with 
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U.S. equity cross-listings and allow them to raise debt capital at lower rates.5 
However, the ability to raise more and cheaper capital through bond issues after a U.S. 
equity cross-listing is far from certain. First, U.S. regulations and creditor protection rules 
explicitly only apply to bonds registered with the SEC (i.e., Yankee bonds), and even SEC 
registrations do not completely substitute for home-country institutions.6 In all other cases, the 
quality of debt enforcement and the creditor protection in the issuing firm’s home country likely 
continues to shape the availability, structure, and terms of the bond contracts (La Porta et al. 
1997; Qian and Strahan 2007). Also, the physical location of assets used as collateral determines 
bondholders’ ability to enforce and recover claims. Hence, bondholders might accept lower risk 
premiums only from firms located in countries that protect creditor rights (e.g., Licht 2003; 
Siegel 2005). 
Second, equity cross-listings can significantly exacerbate the agency costs of debt, which 
result from the conflicts of interest between shareholders and debt holders (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Myers 1977). Since cross-listings are typically associated with improvements 
in growth opportunities (Doidge et al. 2004; Hail and Leuz 2009), managers might be tempted 
to make investments that maximize shareholders’ wealth rather than total firm value. For 
instance, firms might avoid safe positive net present value projects in favor of risky, but negative 
net present value projects such as takeovers.7 The ensuing increase in debt-related agency costs 
might lead to a lower likelihood of issuing bonds and higher risk premiums. 
                                                 
5  It is important to note that liquidity improvements in the bond market are closely related to changes in the 
quality of the information environment. Hence, it is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the liquidity 
hypothesis from the bonding and information hypothesis. 
6  Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002) and Miller and Reisel (2012) show that investors in Yankee bonds (i.e., 
bonds issued in the U.S. by foreign firms) require higher yield spreads and impose more restrictive debt 
covenants if the issuing firm is from a country with weak creditor rights protection. 
7  Leverage often increases after takeovers (Kim and McConnell 1977; Ghosh and Jain 2000). Higher leverage 
reduces the value of existing debt by increasing the probability and deadweight costs of a possible future 
bankruptcy and by reordering the priority of claims in the case of default (e.g., issuance of more senior debt). 
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Finally, the stipulated benefits likely depend on the type of debt issued. Public bond 
investors are at arm’s length. They exercise limited control over the decisions of borrowers, do 
not take on an active monitoring role, and mainly rely on publicly available information. Due 
to the inherent free-rider problem they face, bondholders rarely renegotiate the bond contract if 
credit problems arise (e.g., Diamond 1984, 1991). Thus, they should benefit from better 
information, monitoring, and visibility that goes along with a U.S. exchange-listing. On the 
other hand, the difference between home country institutions and the U.S. regulatory system is 
less likely to affect the issuance and yields of privately placed bonds and bank debt given that 
these lenders already engage in active monitoring and rely on private access to borrower 
information. Private bond placements typically involve only a small group of sophisticated 
investors and have more restrictive covenants than public bonds (e.g., Kwan and Carleton 
2010). Banks can more effectively monitor their loan portfolio as they often have existing 
relationships with the borrowing firm, and because of their privileged access to information, 
they can include extensive protection features in the lending contracts (e.g., performance 
pricing, covenants, seniority, etc.).8 Thus, the information and monitoring benefits from U.S. 
equity cross-listings are less obvious for these types of debt securities. 
3 Research design and sample description 
3.1 Propensity of bond financing analyses 
To empirically test the debt-related benefits of U.S. equity cross-listings we first examine 
changes in the propensity of issuing corporate bonds. We estimate the following probit model: 
                                                 
8  Consistent with bank lenders being better able to mitigate agency issues than public debt holders, Harvey et 
al. (2004) find that equity returns around the issuance of syndicated loans (but not public bonds) are positively 
associated with management’s separation of ownership and control and with the extent of assets in place that 
can be exploited by the management. 
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Bond issuei,t = β0 + β1aPPi,t + β1bOTCi,t + β1cEXCHi,t + β2Cross-listing firmi +  
 βjDebt and equity financing, firm-specific controlsi,t + βkFixed effectsi,t + εi,t. (1) 
The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes on the value of ‘1’ if a firm issues 
a fixed-rate corporate bond in a year, either publicly or via private placements, and ‘0’ otherwise. 
The primary test variable is a non-U.S. firm’s cross-listing status of its equity shares. We 
construct three binary indicator variables that take on the value of ‘1’ in years in which the firm 
has (i) an exchange-listing on NYSE, Nasdaq, or Amex (EXCH), (ii) an over-the-counter listing 
in the Pink Sheets or the OTC Bulletin Board (OTC), and (iii) a private placement under Rule 
144A (PP). The distinction reflects different enforcement and disclosure consequences. Before 
2007, foreign firms with a U.S. exchange-listing had to file Form 20-F with the SEC, requiring 
extensive disclosures and a reconciliation of foreign financial statements to U.S. GAAP.9 After 
November 15, 2007, the SEC eased this requirement for firms reporting under International 
Financial Reporting Standards. Exchange-listed firms are subject to SEC enforcement and can 
face legal liabilities from shareholder litigation. In contrast, OTC listings do not require 
extensive disclosures or 20-F filings but a registration statement using Form F-6 and home-
country disclosures. They are subject to Rule 10b-5 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
under which SEC enforcement actions and private securities litigation can be brought. Private 
placements do not require registration with the SEC or additional disclosures. 
Cross-listing represents a voluntary choice on the part of the firm. To address this potential 
self-selection issue, we include a Cross-listing firm indicator equal to ‘1’ if the firm has an ADR 
outstanding during the sample period. This variable controls for time-invariant firm attributes 
associated with the cross-listing decision. In the spirit of a difference-in-differences analysis, 
                                                 
9  We include Canadian firms in this group because they can directly list their shares on U.S. exchanges without 
using depository receipts and, at the same time, are exempted from certain U.S. reporting requirements under 
the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System. 
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the variable allows us to identify the cross-listing effect from comparing the post-cross-listing 
years to the pre-cross-listing years of the same firms as well as the other firms that never cross 
list.10 We further include separate indicators (Previous bond issue, Loan-issuing firm, and 
Equity-issuing firm) to control for the presence of alternative sources of external funding. Firms 
that have just come off another bond issuance within the last two years, or are able to access 
alternative sources of external funding, typically have a better standing among (prospective) 
bond investors. 
Next, we include several firm attributes shown to be related to bond offerings. Firm size, 
measured as Market value in US$ million, is a proxy for information asymmetry between firms 
and investors. Larger firms should obtain more favorable financing terms. Leverage, measured 
as the ratio of long-term debt divided by total assets, captures the current capital structure and 
is related to the probability of future default. Tangibility stands for the quality of assets available 
as collateral, and equals firms’ book value of property, plant and equipment scaled by total 
assets. Return on assets is the ratio of operating income divided by average total assets. It 
reflects current performance and future growth prospects. Negative earnings takes on the value 
of ‘1’ if the firm reports operating losses in a year, and ‘0’ otherwise. Loss firms are expected 
to face more scrutiny from investors. We measure Funding needs as net cash flows from 
operations divided by total assets (multiplied by -1). Higher values stand for greater external 
funding needs. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. 
Firms with valuable growth options (high market-to-book ratios) need more financing but they 
                                                 
10  In a related study, Boubakri et al. (2013) examine factors that influence the propensity of issuing debt (and 
equity) in the first year after a U.S. equity cross-listing. They exclusively focus on a sample of ADR firms and, 
hence, the insights are limited to the incremental changes in the propensity of issuing debt given the firm is 
already cross-listed. In contrast, we utilize a panel that includes all observations pre and post cross-listing as 
well as non-cross-listed firms. This design lets us speak directly to the incremental effects of cross-listing on 
the propensity of issuing debt (relative to the pre-period and the non-cross-listed firms). 
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also might be riskier. Return variability is a proxy for the firm’s riskiness, and is computed as 
the annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns. Finally, we include country, one-digit 
SIC industry, and year fixed effects in the model. 
Data on corporate bond offerings are from Thompson Deals, complemented by the 
Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). We distinguish between bonds issued in 
public offerings as opposed to private placements (Public bonds), the firm’s country of domicile 
(Domestic bonds), or abroad (Foreign bonds). We collect syndicated loans from Dealscan and 
data on equity offerings from the SDC Platinum database. We determine a firm’s cross-listing 
status at any point during the sample period based on ADR data gathered from Citibank, JP 
Morgan, Bank of New York, Datastream, and Bloomberg (see Hail and Leuz 2009, for details 
on the data collection and coding). We use this information to construct a comprehensive panel 
of firms’ debt and equity financing behavior and their U.S. cross-listing status in a year. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the sample composition by country (Panel A) and year 
(Panel B). We manually match the external financing and cross-listing panel to the Worldscope 
universe (except for U.S. firms).11 We exclude financial firms (one-digit SIC code equal to 6), 
firms with market values below US$ 10 million, and require each sample country to comprise 
at least 30 unique firms and one ADR. The sample comprises 195,999 firm-years from 46 
countries over the years 1992 to 2012. About 11 percent of the yearly observations are from 
firms with a U.S. equity cross-listing (2.9 percent represent EXCH years) and 19 percent from 
firms that issue bonds (3.2 percent are Bond issue years). Except for maybe Japan, which 
comprises 20 percent of the sample (30 percent of the Bond issue years), no single country plays 
                                                 
11 If ticker information or data like the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) is not available, 
we base the matching on the issuing firm’s name, country of domicile, and 4-digit SIC code. This procedure 
does not allow us to identify debt and equity offerings by subsidiaries if they are incorporated under a different 
name, domiciled in a different country, or belong to a different industry than their parent company. 
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a dominant role in terms of external financing or U.S. cross-listing.12 The yearly data in Panel 
B show that U.S. exchange-listings peak around the introduction of SOX in 2002. The depressed 
bond and loan financing activity around the global financial crisis in 2007/2008 is also apparent. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used to estimate Eq. (1), 
together with further details on the variable measurement in the table caption. 
3.2 Bond yield-to-maturity analyses 
The second test examines whether U.S. equity cross-listings are associated with lower 
bond offering yields. We estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression: 
Bond yield-to-maturityi,t = 0 + 1aPPi,t + 1bOTCi,t + 1cEXCHi,t + 2Cross-listing firmi + 
 jBond-specific, firm-specific & macroeconomic controlsi,t + kFixed effectsi,t + i,t. (2) 
The dependent variable, Bond yield-to-maturity, is the offering yield of the bond at the 
time of the issuance (in percent). We use the same three cross-listing types, PP, OTC, and EXCH, 
as the test variables, and again include the Cross-listing firm indicator. Because yield-to-
maturity is likely affected by the expected real interest rates in the country of domicile and 
investors’ time preferences for money, we include the contemporaneous yields on U.S. Treasury 
securities (U.S. T-bill rate) and on local government securities (Local T-bill rate) with similar 
maturities and coupon rates as control variables. 
Other bond characteristics are included as control variables. Bond maturity measures the 
number of months from the date of issuance until maturity. Longer maturities increase the risk 
and should require higher yields. Bond size equals the principal amount at issuance in 
US$ million. Larger bonds increase the risk of default, yet are more actively traded thereby 
                                                 
12 The bias towards Japanese firms is already present in Thompson Deals and Mergent FISD, consistent with 
prior evidence suggesting that Japanese firms moved away from bank debt towards public debt financing in 
the 1990s (Hoshi et al. 1993). 
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lowering the liquidity premium. The binary indicator Investment grade captures a bond’s default 
risk and is equal to ‘1’ if the bond’s credit rating is BBB- or higher (Standard & Poor’s) or Baa3 
or higher (Moody’s).13 Riskier bonds pay higher yields. Callable and Subordinated are two 
indicators if the issuer retains the privilege of redeeming the bond before maturity, and the bond 
ranks after other debt instruments in case of liquidation. To measure firms’ reputation in the 
bond market, we include the Previous bond issue indicator variable. Reputable firms have 
already shared information with market participants and, hence, should face lower information 
asymmetries. 
In addition to the firm attributes Market value, Leverage, Tangibility, Return on Assets, 
and Market-to-book already described in Section 3.1, we include a set of macroeconomic 
controls that likely affects the price of debt. High Inflation, measured as the median monthly 
percentage change in the consumer price index in a country and year, typically translates into 
higher interest rates for corporate debt. We measure a country’s financial development by the 
logarithm of the annual gross domestic product (GDP). Country creditworthiness reflects the 
credit rating of sovereign debt. We measure Exchange rate volatility as the coefficient of 
variation of daily US$ to local currency exchange rates in a year. We expect bond yields to 
reflect currency volatilities. We include country, industry, and year fixed effects. 
Table 1 presents the number of firm-years with yield data available by country (Panel A) 
and year (Panel B). We use Thompson Deals and Mergent FISD to collect data on issue size, 
issue date, bond features, ratings, and coupon rates. For many data items the availability is much 
sparser for international bonds than for U.S. bonds. We exclude convertible bonds, bonds with 
                                                 
13 If credit ratings are missing (i.e., for about 75% of the sample), we compute Altman’s (1968) Z-score as 
(1.2*working capital + 1.4*retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT + 0.999*sales)/total assets + (0.6*market value of 
equity/book value of total liabilities), and use 2.675 as cutoff value to assign investment grade status. The 
two measures are significantly and positively correlated for the subsample with both available. 
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floating rate coupons, and bonds with issue sizes smaller than US$ 10 million. If there are 
multiple offerings per firm and year, we only keep the largest bond. The sample comprises 5,467 
bond offerings from 35 countries over the years 1992 to 2012, of which 39 percent are from 
Japanese firms (see the sensitivity analyses in Section 4.2). Table 2, Panel B, provides summary 
statistics of the variables used to estimate Eq. (2). The mean bond issue has a size of US$ 252 
million, an offering yield of 4.44 percent, and matures in 6.3 years. About 38 and 52 percent of 
the bond issues are investment grade and from firms that repeatedly access the bond market, 
respectively. The notes to Table 2 contain further details on the variable measurement. 
4 Main results 
4.1 Propensity of bond financing analyses 
We begin the analyses by examining the propensity of bond financing after U.S. equity 
cross-listings. Table 3 reports coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) z-statistics from 
estimating Eq. (1). We assess the statistical significance with standard errors clustered by firm. 
The specifications across the table vary by the composition of the sample we include. Model 1 
comprises the full sample of bond issuing and non-issuing firms with and without equity cross-
listings over the years 1992 to 2012. In Model 2 we limit the sample to firms that at some point 
during the sample period have their shares cross-listed in the U.S. This subsample is less subject 
to selection concerns as, by construction, all firms have affirmatively answered the cost-benefit 
tradeoff of the cross-listing choice. In Models 3 and 4 we limit the analysis to firms with either 
a bond or syndicated loan financing over the sample period, and the firm-years in which the 
bond offering or loan financing took place. In the latter model the dependent variable is set to 
‘1’ in years with bond offerings and ‘0’ in years with syndicated loans. These are firms with a 
proven need for external financing and a sufficient standing to access external markets. For 
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Models 5 and 6 we split the full sample by the year 2002 of the introduction of SOX. After a 
series of accounting scandals, SOX aimed at rebuilding public trust in U.S. capital markets by 
increasing corporate transparency and reliability (e.g., Coates and Srinivasan 2014).14 SOX 
arguably has shifted the cost-benefit tradeoff firms face when deciding on a U.S. cross-listing 
(Doidge 2009, 2010). 
Across all six models, EXCH is positive and highly significant, indicating an increase in 
the occurrence of corporate bond offerings following an equity listing on a U.S. exchange 
relative to the pre-period and the benchmark sample. The coefficient magnitude suggests that 
the propensity to issue bonds increases between 75 (Model 1) and 491 basis points (Model 5), 
depending on the comparison. The findings support the notion that the regulatory and disclosure 
consequences of equity cross-listings translate to bond financing, consistent with Reese and 
Weisbach (2002) and Lins et al. (2005). Models 3 and 4 show that debt-issuing firms substitute 
loan financing with corporate bonds, consistent with better transparency and lower information 
asymmetries between the firm and its lenders after the equity exchange-listing. The effects are 
largest in the pre-SOX period, but persist after SOX was introduced. Regarding the other ADR 
types, PP is positive and significant in three models, but not in the full sample. Prior literature 
shows that firms with a private equity placement in the U.S. are growth firms in need of external 
capital (e.g., Hail and Leuz 2009). The results suggest that they are also more likely to access 
corporate bond markets. Similarly, firms with stock trading in the U.S. OTC markets tend to 
issue more bonds (primarily before SOX), but the OTC coefficient is smaller in magnitude and 
statistical significance across all models. The rank ordering of the three ADR variables is 
                                                 
14 Consistent with this argument, Andrade et al. (2014) find that SOX is associated with a significant decrease 
in the cost of debt mainly due to an increase in corporate transparency. 
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consistent with exchange-listings conferring the largest monitoring, transparency, and visibility 
benefits to bond-issuing firms. 
The Cross-listing firm variable is consistently positive, indicating that these firms more 
frequently issue bonds to begin with. The significant coefficient underscores the importance of 
controlling for selection issues. The three debt and equity financing variables are always 
positive and significant (except for Loan-issuing firm in Model 3). This finding suggests that 
the various avenues of external capital raising complement each other. Firms with a history of 
raising debt or equity capital are more likely to issue corporate bonds than non-issuing firms. In 
line with Houston and James (1996) or Cantillo and Wright (2000), we find that larger firms 
with higher leverage rely more on bond financing. Greater funding needs and better growth 
prospects are positively related to the issuance of bonds. Riskier firms as measured by a higher 
volatility of stock returns and the incurrence of losses are less likely to issue bonds. All these 
control variables have coefficients with the expected signs. 
4.2 Bond yield-to-maturity analyses 
We next turn to the analysis of the cost of issuing bonds. Panel A of Table 4 reports 
coefficient estimates and (in parenthesis) t-statistics from estimating Eq. (2). We assess the 
statistical significance with standard errors clustered by firm. The specifications across the table 
vary by the set of control variables we include and the sample period. Model 1 only contains 
the bond-specific controls. Because bond features such as maturity or callability likely are 
determined simultaneously with offering yields, we estimate Model 2 in a reduced form that 
only includes the firm-specific and macroeconomic controls (see e.g., Qian and Strahan 2007; 
Miller and Reisel 2012). Model 3 includes the full set of control variables and is estimated for 
the entire sample. For Models 4 and 5, we split the sample by the introduction of SOX. 
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Across all five models, EXCH is negative and significant, indicating a decrease in bond 
offering yields after an equity cross-listing on a U.S. exchange relative to the pre-period and the 
benchmark sample. The coefficient magnitude indicates a reduction in offering yields, on 
average, by about 38 basis points (Model 3). This estimate translates into yearly cost savings on 
the order of US$ 1 million per firm, based on the mean bond size of US$ 252 million.15 The 
results are present both in the period before and, at lower levels of statistical significance, after 
SOX. The OTC coefficients are negative but insignificant. We find some evidence that private 
equity placements in the U.S. are associated with lower bond offering yields, but only in the 
pre-SOX period and at lower levels of statistical significance. The rank ordering of the three 
ADR variables is consistent with exchange-listings conferring the largest yield benefits to firms, 
mapping into the propensity test results. Thus, obtaining lower offering yields seems one of the 
main reasons why corporate bond issues become more popular after non-U.S. firms cross-list 
their shares on a U.S. exchange. 
The control variables are mostly significant and exhibit the expected signs. Local T-bill 
rates are positively related to bond yields, as are U.S. T-bill rates (except for the post-SOX 
period), but to a lower extent. Bonds with longer maturities, callable bonds, and bonds that are 
subordinated in the case of default carry higher offering yields. Bond size, investment grade 
status, and reputation in the bond market are each associated with lower yields. Large, profitable 
and less leveraged firms with lots of tangible assets can issue bonds at significantly lower cost. 
A country’s inflation and, somewhat surprisingly, GDP are positively related to bond offering 
yields, while the credit rating of sovereign debt exhibits a negative relation. 
                                                 
15  This yearly benefit could be enhanced by additional cost savings associated with future debt issuances at lower 
offering yields. At the same time, we acknowledge that debt offerings after U.S. equity cross-listings are not 
costless, but might involve additional compliance, administrative, and reputational costs. We do not provide 
evidence on these costs and, hence, cannot say whether the debt transactions are net beneficial. 
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In Panel B of Table 4 we summarize several sensitivity analyses of the bond yield-to-
maturity results. The table presents the coefficient estimates (and t-statistics) of the cross-listing 
variables only, but unless indicated otherwise we include all the controls and fixed effects (see 
Model 3 of Panel A). In the first two models, we use the yield spreads as the dependent variable, 
computed by either subtracting U.S. or local T-bill rates from bond offering yields. The first 
adjustment accounts for common time preferences among investors, while the second considers 
local factors like sovereign risk or inflation in the issuing firm’s home country. In both models, 
the yield effects of U.S. equity exchange-listings are very similar if not stronger than those 
reported in Panel A. 
Next, we examine alternative sample selection choices. In Model 3, we assess the impact 
of the by far largest country in terms of observations on the results, Japan. We randomly select 
300 Japanese firm-years for the analysis, which reduces the weight to a level comparable with 
other large countries like Canada or South Korea. The EXCH coefficient remains significant 
and negative, but the magnitude is slightly smaller than in the full sample. In Model 4, we allow 
for multiple bond offerings per firm and year, nearly doubling the number of observations, and 
in Model 5, we include convertible bonds. In both cases, EXCH is significantly negative, and 
the OTC coefficient becomes significant. 
Finally, we control for the potential variable bias due to the endogenous nature of firms’ 
cross-listing decision. The Cross-listing firm indicator only captures time-invariant (unobserved) 
differences between ADR and non-ADR firms. In Model 6, we include the inverse Mills ratio 
from a selection model of the U.S. exchange-listing decision in the regression. That is, we model 
EXCH as a function of the same set of firm-specific variables that we use in the propensity tests 
(see Table 3) plus the percentage of foreign sales and Altman’s (1968) Z-score. We then 
estimate the resulting probit regression separately for each year, and compute the corresponding 
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inverse Mills ratios, which we include in the second stage as a separate variable. In Model 7, 
we eliminate the bond offerings in the two years immediately after the cross-listing. This 
procedure mitigates the anticipation of future bond benefits when firms decide whether to cross-
list their shares in the U.S. In Model 8, we interact the Cross-listing firm indicator with all the 
firm-specific controls allowing the weight on these variables to vary between ADR and non-
ADR firms. Across all three tests for endogeneity, the results remain very similar to our main 
findings, and none of the inferences change. 
5 Cross-sectional analyses 
5.1 Different types of debt (and equity) financing 
In our first set of cross-sectional analyses, we investigate different types of debt to shed 
light on the underlying factors driving the debt-related benefits of U.S. equity cross-listings. We 
distinguish between bonds issued in public offerings (Public bonds), privately placed bonds 
(Private bonds), bonds issued at home (Domestic bonds), and bonds issued outside of a firm’s 
home market either as Eurobonds or Yankee bonds (Foreign bonds). These bond types differ in 
terms of the availability of information about the firm, the ease of restructuring and 
renegotiating the contract terms, and the procedures in case of default. We further analyze the 
effect of equity cross-listings on alternative sources of external capital, namely the issuance and 
the cost of syndicated loans (Loan issue and Loan spreads) and the propensity to raise equity 
capital (Equity issue). Table 5 presents the results, with the propensity of issuance analyses in 
Panel A and the yield-to-maturity/spread analyses in Panel B. 
In Models 1 to 4 of Panel A, we re-estimate Eq. (1) using the different bond-type indictors 
as dependent variables. In Models 5 and 6, we use Loan issue and Equity issue as dependent 
variables, respectively, and slightly adjust the specification of Eq. (1) to reflect the financing 
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history of the firm. In the loan model, we control for previous loan issues and whether the firm 
has ever issued a bond or raised equity capital; in the equity model, we control for previous 
equity issues and whether the firm has ever issued a corporate bond or syndicated loan. All the 
remaining control variables and fixed effects are the same. The results for the EXCH coefficient 
across the various models reveal the following pattern: after an equity cross-listing on a U.S. 
exchange, non-U.S. firms are more likely to issue bonds in a public offering and outside of their 
country of domicile. The likelihood of loan financing also increases. At the same time, these 
firms issue fewer bonds in their domestic market, while the propensity to privately place a 
corporate bond or of a seasoned equity offering is unaffected. The coefficients on the PP and 
OTC variables are mainly insignificant, except when using Foreign bonds (both PP and OTC 
are positive) or Equity issue (PP is positive, OTC negative) as the dependent variable. The 
results are consistent with equity exchange-listings in the U.S. strengthening the information 
and monitoring position of bondholders. A decrease in information asymmetry for lenders that 
rely mainly on public information lets the borrowing firms shift from private to public debt (e.g., 
Leland and Pyle 1977; Diamond 1984; Fama 1985). The results also provide support for the 
visibility argument stipulating that U.S. cross-listings attract new (foreign) investors. 
In Models 1 to 4 of Panel B, we re-estimate Eq. (2), which investigates the determinants 
of bond yields, for the subsets of bond types discussed above. In Model 5, we use the Loan 
Spread as the dependent variable, defined as the interest rate spread that the borrower pays over 
the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) or an equivalent rate for each dollar drawn down.16 
We replace the bond-specific controls in Eq. (2) with an equivalent set of loan-specific variables 
                                                 
16  For the Loan Spread analysis, we pare down the propensity sample to syndicated loans with data available in 
Dealscan, require a minimum loan amount of US$ 10 million, and only retain the loan with the largest facility 
amount per year. The resulting sample comprises 5,200 loan issues from 46 countries. 
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(see the notes to Table 5 for details on these loan-specific variables). The results for the EXCH 
coefficient across the various models reveal the following pattern: after an equity cross-listing 
on a U.S. exchange, non-U.S. firms can issue public bonds and bonds outside of their country 
of domicile at lower issuing yields. The reduction in yield-to-maturity is on the order of 40 to 
53 basis points, a magnitude that is economically significant. These reductions nicely map into 
the propensity results from Panel A. When the yield benefits are largest, firms react and issue 
more bonds. Domestic bonds also exhibit a yield reduction, but lower in magnitude and 
statistical significance. There is no yield reduction apparent for private bonds or syndicated 
loans, nor for most of the PP and OTC coefficients. The private bond and syndicated loan results 
suggest that in markets where private monitoring and communication is common (e.g., Ivashina 
and Sun 2011), opting out of the local institutional environment does not improve the lenders’ 
position in terms of information and monitoring, and, consequently, offering yields. However, 
because lenders in these agreements can renegotiate contractual terms at relatively low cost, 
they might make non-price adjustments such as changing the number of protective covenants, 
adding performance pricing features, or requiring more revolving loans (e.g., Leftwich 1983; 
Beatty et al. 2008; Gigler et al. 2009).17 
5.2 Institutional characteristics of the issuing firm’s country of domicile 
In our second set of cross-sectional tests, we condition the analyses on institutional 
characteristics of an issuing firm’s country of domicile. Under the bonding hypothesis, equity 
investors in firms from countries with weak institutions should benefit the most from a U.S. 
exchange listing (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004; Hail and Leuz 2009). However, whether these 
benefits translate to the bondholders of the firm is less clear. We use the following three country-
                                                 
17  The lack of data in Dealscan does not allow us to pursue these alternative channels empirically. 
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level variables to partition the sample: (i) based on Dyck and Zingales (2004), we distinguish 
between countries with large and small private benefits of control, measured as the average 
price premium paid in the acquisition of a controlling equity block. Control benefits serve as 
proxy for the protection of minority shareholders’ interests. The larger the private benefits of 
control, the weaker the local investor protection (and, hence, the larger the expected benefits 
from bonding to the U.S. regulatory system). (ii) We use the debt enforcement scores from 
Djankov et al. (2008) to partition the sample into countries with more and less efficient debt 
enforcement procedures. The score proxies for the extent to which creditor rights are protected 
and is measured as the discounted terminal value of a typical firm after all bankruptcy costs. 
Higher values indicate better chances of debt recovery and quicker resolution of uncertainty for 
bondholders. (iii) We consider the relative importance of the local bond market by measuring a 
country’s aggregate market capitalization of public bonds over GDP. Higher values stand for 
relatively more important bond markets. Table 6, Panel A, reports the raw values of the 
institutional variables together with a binary indicator (created using the sample median as the 
cut-off), which we use to split the sample countries into two groups. 
To analyze the impact of a firm’s home country institutions on the debt-related benefits 
of U.S. equity cross-listings, we repeat the propensity of issuance analyses (Table 6, Panel B) 
and the yield-to-maturity analyses (Table 6, Panel C) separately for the two groups of countries. 
We tabulate only the three ADR type variables, but each specification includes the full set of 
controls and fixed effects. The results from the propensity analyses reveal the following picture: 
after an equity cross-listing on a U.S. exchange, non-U.S. firms domiciled in countries with 
small benefits of control, efficient debt enforcement procedures, and developed bond markets 
are more likely to issue bonds, but not the other way around. The significant EXCH coefficient 
in Model 1 indicates that, contrary to bonding in the equity market, U.S. cross-listings do not 
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offset the institutional weaknesses of a firm’s home country when it comes to bond investors. 
One explanation is that a stronger position of equity shareholders might come at the expense of 
debt holders, who bear additional agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977). The 
significant EXCH coefficient in Model 4 suggests that creditor rights protection in the home 
country remains an important factor (Qian and Strahan 2007). For instance, even though many 
bond contracts include a “choice of law” clause that allows lenders to use the laws in the country 
of issuance (e.g., U.K. law if a bond is issued in London) to supersede the laws in the borrower's 
country of domicile, the clause typically does not extend to bankruptcy proceedings or situations 
that require the sale of tangible assets to refund secured creditors. The fact that debt enforcement 
in the home country is key, points to the existence of visibility and liquidity benefits conferred 
by the certifying role of a U.S. exchange-listing. The significant EXCH coefficient in Model 6 
conveys the same message. Firms in countries with developed bond markets seem to benefit the 
most from a U.S. equity cross-listing. 
In Panel C, we show the yield-to-maturity results. Consistent with the findings of a higher 
frequency of bond issuance, the results suggest that after an equity cross-listing on a U.S. 
exchange, non-U.S. firms domiciled in countries with small private benefits of control, efficient 
debt enforcement, and developed bond markets can issue bonds at lower offering yields of about 
40 to 47 basis points. We find no evidence of lower offering yields for the other countries. 
6 Conclusion 
We examine whether cross-listing equity shares on a U.S. exchange facilitates non-U.S. 
firms’ access to bond markets. Prior literature primarily focused on the equity market benefits 
of U.S. cross-listings, which stem from the comparative advantages of both the U.S capital 
markets with their depth and liquidity and the U.S. judicial system with its more transparent 
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disclosures, investor protection, and effective monitoring. Similar benefits should extend to 
bond investors. However, poor creditor protection in cross-listed firms’ countries of domicile 
and higher agency costs between debt and equity holders might mitigate these benefits. 
We employ a comprehensive panel of corporate bonds spanning 46 countries and 20 years 
to analyze the incidence and cost of bond issuance. We find that non-U.S. firms are more likely 
to issue bonds after cross-listing on a U.S. exchange at offering yields that, on average, are 
lower by about 38 basis points. Firms issue more public bonds and bonds in foreign markets, 
suggesting that the certification role of equity cross-listings mainly benefits investors without 
privileged access to inside information and that were unfamiliar with the firm. We also show 
that equity cross-listings do not completely offset the institutional weaknesses in a firm’s home 
country, and are concentrated in countries with small private benefits of control, efficient debt 
enforcement procedures, and developed bond markets, consistent with increased visibility and, 
hence, higher liquidity from the equity cross-listing. 
Several caveats are in order when interpreting the results. First, our analysis focuses on 
one of the many external-funding sources available to firms (i.e., bond financing). We therefore 
capture only an incomplete picture of the complex issues firms face when selecting their funding 
strategy. Second, our evidence suggests that having shares cross-listed on a U.S. exchange, 
under certain conditions, generates benefits for bondholders. However, we cannot eliminate the 
possibility that the causality runs the other way, that is, that cross-listings are undertaken in light 
of already lower costs of bond financing. Yet, it would be hard to imagine that the decision to 
cross-list in the U.S. varies systematically across our partitions based on different types of cross-
listings, the location of bond issuance, bond types, or country characteristics. Third, we provide 
evidence in support of the information disclosure and liquidity arguments of cross-listing. 
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However, a better understanding of the interplay between these forces is needed. We leave these 
issues to future research. 
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Table 1  Sample composition and descriptive statistics by country and year 
Panel A: Number of observations, type of U.S. equity cross-listing, debt and equity financing by country 
 Unique 
firms 
Firm- 
years 
Firm-years 
with yield 
U.S. equity cross-listings  Bond financing  Loan  
financing 
Equity 
financing Country PP OTC EXCH  Bond Public Domestic Foreign  
Argentina 64 572 1  32 22 108  41 31 4 37  20 24 
Australia 1,558 8,842 90  51 761 207  130 76 57 86  229 2,979 
Austria 99 771 24  45 204 6  30 26 24 6  13 61 
Belgium 133 1,128 31  0 47 15  32 31 19 14  34 72 
Brazil 287 2,221 35  98 307 231  57 26 18 42  56 165 
Canada 1,669 9,570 395  3 1,270 1,751  445 366 235 240  426 2,662 
Chile 132 1,377 37  20 11 143  38 30 29 10  44 55 
China 1,794 16,187 228  32 83 77  177 79 163 15  54 1,183 
Colombia 36 197 1  21 5 4  3 2 1 2  7 7 
Czech Republic 55 258 0  17 0 0  6 6 0 6  5 2 
Denmark 172 1,767 5  0 10 39  12 12 3 10  16 97 
Egypt 79 419 0  56 16 0  1 1 1 0  4 14 
Finland 156 1,740 23  37 38 54  47 39 34 14  63 128 
France 924 7,688 224  67 252 248  364 338 144 241  299 479 
Germany 813 6,569 85  58 249 193  148 125 60 93  210 497 
Greece 258 1,524 0  56 15 14  3 2 0 3  33 69 
Hong Kong 622 5,554 57  12 632 100  98 59 29 70  263 861 
India 1,379 7,148 249  1,011 27 62  308 260 266 49  208 569 
Indonesia 258 2,129 0  15 19 20  14 9 12 2  90 39 
Ireland 102 785 0  1 100 81  15 10 14 1  36 125 
Israel 273 1,343 1  7 17 92  5 4 2 3  15 134 
Italy 325 3,007 50  88 43 91  63 55 37 28  93 197 
Japan 4,091 40,157 2,142  13 426 414  1,934 1,811 1,626 385  355 1,898 
Korea (South) 1,412 10,496 677  272 25 104  881 719 793 129  279 772 
Malaysia 689 6,241 91  0 108 0  114 11 99 16  102 480 
Mexico 117 1,156 49  169 241 251  77 46 32 51  63 57 
The Netherlands 216 2,208 48  38 174 201  81 70 21 66  94 151 
New Zealand 138 950 0  0 9 36  25 18 19 6  11 88 
Norway 275 1,927 25  27 96 59  41 31 16 27  55 259 
Pakistan 99 833 0  34 0 0  1 1 0 1  14 6 
Peru 72 497 33  21 25 16  37 36 35 2  4 17 
Philippines 122 1,071 22  72 22 18  35 12 25 13  45 86 
Poland 316 1,921 0  105 34 1  4 1 0 4  19 130 
Portugal 84 719 6  25 38 23  7 6 2 5  15 38 
Russia 188 692 30  202 125 25  32 24 24 13  44 33 
 
Table 1  (continued) 
 Unique 
firms 
Firm- 
years 
Firm-years 
with yield 
U.S. equity cross-listings  Bond financing  Loan  
financing 
Equity 
financing Country PP OTC EXCH  Bond Public Domestic Foreign  
Singapore 489 4,287 105  21 200 16  126 82 107 22  139 499 
South Africa 346 2,389 4  69 234 127  9 6 4 5  29 91 
Spain 157 1,396 27  14 37 67  28 27 14 16  109 138 
Sri Lanka 77 252 0  18 0 0  1 1 0 1  1 4 
Sweden 412 3,282 48  5 98 96  59 53 31 33  98 342 
Switzerland 243 2,716 98  47 57 91  139 130 104 36  115 120 
Taiwan 1,467 13,019 145  655 4 80  264 193 207 63  962 1,269 
Thailand 392 3,461 156  22 88 7  156 127 137 25  118 230 
Turkey 212 1,657 0  77 23 10  4 1 1 3  24 73 
United Arab Emirates 41 198 0  1 0 0  0 0 0 0  7 11 
United Kingdom 1,738 13,678 225   96 630 583   269 198 130 165   467 1,802 
Total 24,581 195,999 5,467   3,730 6,822 5,761   6,361 5,191 4,579 2,059   5,387 19,013 
 
Panel B: Number of observations, type of U.S. equity cross-listing, debt and equity financing by year 
Year Firm- years 
Firm-years 
with yield 
U.S. equity cross-listings  Bond financing  Loan  
financing 
Equity 
financing PP OTC EXCH  Bond Public Domestic Foreign  
1992 2,167 182  16 76 107  100 90 26 86  17 56 
1993 2,485 216  24 90 123  161 143 51 119  40 106 
1994 2,847 105  30 120 151  137 122 57 90  74 151 
1995 3,215 158  69 146 162  146 129 87 79  118 136 
1996 3,953 207  123 186 187  250 223 121 148  202 189 
1997 4,391 180  137 216 230  209 180 119 101  222 213 
1998 4,663 243  154 220 261  213 200 150 72  157 254 
1999 5,132 167  175 250 304  194 175 98 103  198 303 
2000 8,893 187  182 275 349  298 243 198 108  261 608 
2001 10,031 227  178 287 382  356 307 257 115  378 590 
2002 10,642 208  171 302 389  336 290 243 105  332 751 
2003 11,384 242  198 330 398  369 291 236 144  351 1,063 
2004 12,408 228  212 339 393  331 226 198 150  367 1,465 
2005 13,382 236  231 350 386  324 236 194 139  387 1,439 
2006 14,268 218  255 361 356  314 252 173 149  401 1,501 
2007 15,291 265  258 418 312  288 201 256 42  363 1,977 
2008 14,486 294  263 390 275  324 252 297 35  336 1,373 
2009 14,406 466  264 430 265  507 410 460 62  253 1,944 
2010 15,014 472  286 474 260  525 429 476 68  324 1,883 
2011 14,550 494  291 698 263  510 413 468 63  342 1,640 
2012 12,391 472   213 864 208   469 379 414 81   264 1,371 
Total 195,999 5,467   3,730 6,822 5,761   6,361 5,191 4,579 2,059   5,387 19,013 
 
Table 1  (continued) 
The sample comprises a maximum of 195,999 firm-year observations from 46 countries between 1992 and 2012 for which sufficient Worldscope financial data 
and Datastream stock price data exist. We exclude financial firms (one-digit SIC code equal to 6), and require a minimum market value of US$ 10 million. We 
only include countries with more than 30 unique firms and at least one American Depositary Receipt or direct listing in the U.S. (ADR). The yield-to-maturity 
sample comprises non-convertible fixed-rate bonds with a minimum bond amount of 10 US$ million. If a firm has multiple issues in a given year, we retain 
only the bond with the largest principal amount. The table reports the number of unique firms, total firm-years, firm-years with bond yield-to-maturity data, 
and firm-years with ADRs, bond, loan, and equity financing by country (Panel A) and year (Panel B). The ADR variables consist of the following binary 
indicators (see Hail and Leuz 2009, for details): PP is equal to 1 if the firm has a private placement under Rule 144A in the U.S., OTC is equal to 1 if firm 
shares trade in the U.S. over-the-counter markets, and EXCH is equal to 1 if firm shares are listed on the NYSE, Nasdaq, or Amex. The debt and equity 
financing variables consist of the following binary indicators: Bond issue is equal to 1 if the firm undertakes a public or private fixed-rate bond offering 
(source: Thompson Deals and Mergent). We further distinguish between bonds issued in public market offerings (Public bonds), in the firms’ country of 
domicile (Domestic bonds), or abroad, either as a Eurobond or Yankee bond in the U.S. (Foreign bonds). Loan issue is equal to 1 if the firm undertakes a 
syndicated loan offering (source: Dealscan). Equity issue is equal to 1 if the firm externally raises shareholders’ equity capital (source: SDC Platinum). 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics of variables used in regression analyses 
Panel A: Variables used in propensity of debt (or equity) financing regressions 
Variables (N=195,999) Mean Std. dev. P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Cross-listing variables (indicators):        
  PP 0.019 0.137      
  OTC 0.035 0.183      
  EXCH 0.029 0.169      
  Cross-listing firm 0.114 0.318      
Debt and equity financing variables (indicators):       
  Bond issue 0.032 0.177      
  Previous bond issue 0.047 0.212      
  Bond-issuing firm 0.191 0.393      
  Previous loan issue 0.044 0.205      
  Loan-issuing firm 0.168 0.374      
  Previous equity issue 0.175 0.380      
  Equity-issuing firm 0.561 0.496      
Firm-specific controls:        
  Market value (US$ million) 1,227 6,709 11 42 131 471 19,950 
  Leverage (ratio) 0.110 0.127 0.000 0.002 0.065 0.177 0.525 
  Tangibility (ratio) 0.325 0.221 0.003 0.148 0.297 0.469 0.881 
  Return on assets (ratio) 0.046 0.103 -0.368 0.013 0.051 0.097 0.264 
  Negative earnings (indicator) 0.194 0.396      
  Funding needs (ratio) -0.054 0.106 -0.282 -0.109 -0.060 -0.012 0.311 
  Market-to-book (ratio) 2.079 2.146 0.274 0.822 1.411 2.480 11.620 
  Return variability (std. dev.) 0.126 0.077 0.034 0.075 0.107 0.155 0.424 
 
Panel B: Variables used in bond yield-to-maturity regressions 
Variables (N=5,467) Mean Std. dev. P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Cross-listing variables (indicators):        
  PP 0.053 0.224      
  OTC 0.066 0.249      
  EXCH 0.081 0.273      
  Cross-listing firm 0.260 0.439      
Bond-specific variables:        
  Bond yield-to-maturity (percent) 4.44% 2.79% 0.52% 2.00% 4.26% 6.09% 12.00% 
  U.S. T-bill rate (percent) 3.73% 1.96% 0.27% 1.97% 3.93% 5.27% 7.26% 
  Local T-bill rate (percent) 3.44% 2.29% 0.37% 1.41% 3.26% 4.84% 9.93% 
  Bond maturity (months) 76.0 46.0 12.0 48.6 60.5 90.2 246.7 
  Bond size (US$ million) 251.5 307.4 11.6 69.7 142.5 300.0 1,500.0 
  Investment grade (indicator) 0.382 0.486      
  Callable (indicator) 0.120 0.325      
  Subordinated (indicator) 0.005 0.069      
  Previous bond issues (indicator) 0.523 0.500      
 
Table 2  (continued) 
Variables (N=5,467) Mean Std. dev. P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Firm-specific controls:        
  Market value (US$ million) 6,873 14,953 46 679 2,296 6,819 82,034 
  Leverage (ratio) 0.247 0.132 0.003 0.154 0.227 0.322 0.606 
  Tangibility (ratio) 0.418 0.232 0.019 0.232 0.392 0.585 0.913 
  Return on assets (ratio) 0.058 0.052 -0.062 0.028 0.050 0.081 0.224 
  Market-to-book (ratio) 1.981 1.588 0.291 1.055 1.585 2.397 8.563 
Macroeconomic controls:        
  Inflation (percent) 1.96% 2.44% -1.35% 0.13% 1.71% 2.81% 11.99% 
  GDP (log US$) 14.261 1.108 11.504 13.647 14.557 15.256 15.374 
  Country creditworthiness (rating) 82.336 10.975 47.650 77.350 86.500 91.050 94.700 
  Exchange rate volatility (ratio) 0.037 0.024 0.000 0.021 0.031 0.046 0.150 
 
The sample comprises a maximum of 195,999 firm-year observations from 46 countries between 1992 and 2012, of which 5,467 have bond yield-to maturity 
data (see Table 1). The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the propensity of debt financing analyses (Panel A) and the bond yield-to-
maturity analyses (Panel B). The cross-listing variables consist of the following binary indicators (see Hail and Leuz 2009, for details): PP is equal to 1 if the 
firm has a private placement under Rule 144A in the U.S., OTC is equal to 1 if firm shares trade in the U.S. over-the-counter markets, and EXCH is equal to 1 
if firm shares are listed on the NYSE, Nasdaq, or Amex. We also define a Cross-listing firm indicator, set equal to 1 if the firm has ADRs outstanding during 
the sample period. The debt and equity financing variables consist of the following binary indicators: Bond issue is equal to 1 if the firm undertakes a public or 
private fixed-rate bond offering (source: Thompson Deals and Mergent). Loan issue is equal to 1 if the firm undertakes a syndicated loan offering (source: 
Dealscan). Equity issue is equal to 1 if the firm externally raises shareholders’ equity capital (source: SDC Platinum). Previous bond (Loan or Equity) issue is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has issued another bond (loan or equity) within the last two fiscal years. We also define separate Bond-, Loan-, and 
Equity-issuing firm indicators, set equal to 1 if the firm engages in the respective financing transactions during the sample period. The firm-specific controls 
consist of the following variables: we compute Market value of equity, denominated in US$ million, as stock price times the number of shares outstanding. 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt divided by total assets. Tangibility is measured as the ratio of the net book value of property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets. Return on assets is the ratio of operating income divided by average total assets. Negative earnings is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm 
reports negative operating income in a given year. We compute Funding needs as net cash flows from operations divided by total assets, and multiply this 
measure by -1 so that higher values indicate higher funding needs. Market-to-book is the ratio of market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
Return variability is the annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns, computed using Datastream stock price information. We use the following bond-
specific variables: Bond yield-to-maturity is measured at the time of the issuance of the bond. U.S. T-bill rate and Local T-bill rate are the yields of U.S. 
Treasury securities or government securities in the issuing firm’s country of domicile with similar maturity and coupon rate as the bond issued. If no long-term 
government securities are available, we use short-term risk-free interest rates instead. Bond maturity is measured in months at the date of the issuance. Bond 
size equals the principal amount in US$ million. Investment grade is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bond’s credit rating is BBB- or higher by Standard 
& Poor’s or Baa3 or higher by Moody’s. If credit ratings are missing, we compute Altman’s (1968) Z-score as (1.2*working capital + 1.4*retained earnings + 
3.3*EBIT + 0.999*sales)/total assets + (0.6*market value of equity/book value of total liabilities), and use 2.675 as cutoff value to assign investment grade 
status. Callable and Subordinated are indicator variables set equal to 1 if the issuer of the bond retains the privilege of redeeming the bond before maturity, or 
if the bond ranks after other debts in case of liquidation. We use the following macroeconomic control variables: Inflation is the yearly median of country-
specific monthly percentage changes in the consumer price index as reported in Datastream. GDP is the natural log of countries’ annual gross domestic product 
(in constant US$), as reported by the World Bank. Country creditworthiness is Institutional Investor’s yearly survey-based country credit rating. The value of 
100 represents maximum creditworthiness. Exchange rate volatility is the coefficient of variation of daily exchange rates (US$ to local currency) in a given 
year. Accounting data and market values are measured as of the fiscal-year end. Except for variables with natural lower or upper bounds, we truncate all 
variables at the first and 99th percentile. 
Table 3  Changes in propensity of bond financing after U.S. equity cross-listings 
Bond issue as 
dependent variable 
Model 1 
(all firms) 
Model 2 
(ADR firms  
only) 
Model 3 
(debt issuing  
firms only) 
Model 4 
(firm-years with  
debt issuances only) 
Model 5 
(pre SOX period 
1992 to 2001) 
Model 6 
(post SOX period 
2002 to 2012) 
Cross-listing variables:       
  PP 0.085 0.188*** 0.133** -0.029 0.196** 0.059 
 (1.57) (2.93) (2.45) (-0.31) (2.29) (0.97) 
  OTC 0.076* 0.093* 0.093* 0.077 0.164** 0.042 
 (1.66) (1.94) (1.90) (0.92) (1.97) (0.84) 
  EXCH 0.150*** 0.234*** 0.194*** 0.176** 0.363*** 0.159*** 
 (3.56) (5.65) (4.21) (2.05) (4.86) (2.21) 
  Cross-listing firm 0.260*** n.a. 0.160*** 0.286*** 0.215*** 0.290*** 
 (6.90)  (4.07) (4.16) (3.53) (6.68) 
Debt and equity financing variables:      
  Previous bond issue 1.138*** 0.876*** 0.790*** 0.909*** 0.922*** 1.165*** 
 (47.00) (21.94) (34.19) (21.34) (23.23) (40.19) 
  Loan-issuing firm 0.484*** 0.366*** -0.104*** n.a. 0.428*** 0.516*** 
 (23.06) (9.40) (-4.20)  (12.93) (21.19) 
  Equity-issuing firm 0.090*** 0.169*** 0.079*** 0.131*** 0.117*** 0.078*** 
 (4.75) (4.10) (3.55) (2.79) (3.92) (3.50) 
Firm-specific controls:      
  Log(Market value) 0.430*** 0.239*** 0.363*** 0.229** 0.394*** 0.416*** 
 (7.62) (4.60) (6.97) (2.55) (4.55) (7.13) 
  Leverage 2.166*** 2.167*** 1.922*** 1.104*** 2.009*** 2.204*** 
 (36.79) (17.68) (25.17) (7.11) (18.38) (32.67) 
  Tangibility -0.067 0.079 0.016 -0.005 -0.123 0.003 
 (-1.50) (0.82) (0.29) (-0.05) (-1.51) (0.07) 
  Return on assets -0.003 0.515* -0.158 -0.606 -0.095 0.092 
 (-0.02) (1.81) (-0.82) (-1.43) (-0.38) (0.56) 
  Negative earnings -0.233*** -0.172*** -0.195*** -0.262*** -0.217*** -0.227*** 
 (-7.86) (-2.73) (-5.58) (-3.34) (-3.91) (-6.44) 
  Funding needs 0.461*** 0.502*** 0.787*** 0.069 0.492** 0.445*** 
 (5.11) (2.72) (5.77) (0.23) (2.51) (4.38) 
  Market-to-book 0.017*** 0.013* 0.031*** 0.023** 0.029*** 0.006 
 (4.78) (1.87) (6.58) (2.09) (4.95) (1.25) 
  Return variability -1.116*** -1.819*** -1.063*** -1.853*** -1.081*** -1.212*** 
 (-8.22) (-5.91) (-6.75) (-5.28) (-4.58) (-7.29) 
Fixed effects C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y 
Pseudo R2 33.41% 29.25% 18.56% 27.73% 32.12% 34.73% 
N 195,999 22,203 54,285 7,898 46,499 147,633 
 
Table 3  (continued) 
The sample comprises a maximum of 195,999 firm-year observations from 46 countries between 1992 and 2012 (see Table 1). The table reports coefficient 
estimates and (in parentheses) z-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm from probit regressions of debt financing on firms’ cross-listing status and 
various control variables. The dependent variable is Bond issue set equal to 1 if the firm undertakes a public or private fixed-rate bond offering in a given year. 
For a description of the independent variables see Table 2. We use log transformations where indicated, and include country (C), one-digit SIC industry (I), 
and year (Y) fixed effects in the regressions, but do not report the coefficients. Model 1 uses all Worldscope observations. Model 2 limits the sample to ADR 
firms. In Model 3 we only include firms that at some point during the sample period issued bonds or syndicated loans (i.e., debt issuing firms). In Model 4 we 
limit the sample to firm-years with bond or loan issuances. That is, a value of 1 of the dependent variable stands for the issuance of bonds and a value of 0 for 
syndicated loans. In Models 5 and 6 we include all observations, but separately analyze the period before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was 
implemented in 2002. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Table 4  Changes in average cost of bond financing after U.S. equity cross-listings 
Panel A: OLS regression analysis of bond yield-to-maturity 
Bond yield-to-maturity 
as dependent variable 
Model 1 
(all firms) 
Model 2 
(all firms) 
Model 3 
(all firms) 
Model 4 
(pre SOX period 
1992 to 2001) 
Model 5 
(post SOX period 
2002 to 2012) 
Cross-listing variables:      
  PP -0.322* -0.294* -0.305* -0.628** -0.178 
 (-1.83) (-1.72) (-1.87) (-1.99) (-0.99) 
  OTC -0.091 -0.132 -0.128 -0.050 -0.116 
 (-0.66) (-0.96) (-1.01) (-0.22) (-0.83) 
  EXCH -0.495*** -0.372** -0.376*** -0.209*** -0.296* 
 (-3.53) (-2.55) (-2.75) (-2.50) (-1.85) 
  Cross-listing firm -0.036 -0.063 0.027 0.066 -0.042 
 (-0.34) (-0.61) (0.27) (0.50) (-0.34) 
Bond-specific variables:      
  U.S. T-bill rate 0.044 0.087** 0.053 0.397*** -0.084** 
 (1.14) (2.44) (1.42) (6.84) (-1.97) 
  Local T-bill rate 0.474*** 0.420*** 0.416*** 0.444*** 0.282*** 
 (12.98) (10.86) (10.86) (6.63) (4.79) 
  Log(Bond maturity) 0.149** n.a. 0.145** 0.176 0.244*** 
 (2.22)  (2.23) (1.35) (3.47) 
  Log(Bond size) -0.031 n.a. -0.044 0.115** -0.172*** 
 (-0.86)  (-1.20) (2.15) (-3.97) 
  Investment grade -0.480*** n.a. -0.296*** -0.039 -0.455*** 
 (-8.34)  (-5.10) (-0.45) (-6.80) 
  Callable 0.575*** n.a. 0.668*** 0.321** 0.913*** 
 (5.28)  (6.32) (2.05) (6.88) 
  Subordinated 0.685 n.a. 0.436 0.001 1.436*** 
 (1.58)  (0.94) (0.00) (3.24) 
  Previous bond issues -0.163*** n.a. -0.255*** -0.179** -0.214*** 
 (-3.67)  (-5.78) (-2.42) (-4.21) 
Firm-specific controls:     
  Log(Market value) n.a. -0.389** -0.220 0.172 -0.448*** 
  (-2.29) (-1.29) (0.93) (-3.31) 
  Leverage n.a. 2.117*** 2.145*** 1.686*** 1.893*** 
  (8.49) (8.52) (4.26) (6.53) 
  Tangibility n.a. -0.449*** -0.410*** 0.025 -0.623*** 
  (-2.94) (-2.79) (0.09) (-3.75) 
  Return on assets n.a. -1.891*** -1.343** -3.286** -0.950 
  (-2.85) (-2.07) (-2.25) (-1.42) 
  Market-to-book n.a. -0.042** -0.030 -0.078*** 0.010 
  (-2.14) (-1.57) (-2.72) (0.39) 
Macroeconomic controls:     
  Inflation n.a. 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.296*** 0.083*** 
  (5.65) (5.67) (4.01) (3.10) 
  Log(GDP) n.a. 0.971* 1.919*** 2.859* 4.582*** 
  (1.79) (3.47) (1.73) (8.24) 
  Country creditworthiness n.a. -0.039*** -0.050*** -0.044 -0.076*** 
  (-3.59) (-4.63) (-1.25) (-6.33) 
  Exchange rate volatility n.a. 3.877** 3.421** -1.354 1.971 
  (2.19) (2.00) (-0.43) (1.00) 
Fixed effects C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y 
Adj. R2 73.40% 73.99% 74.89% 75.35% 77.85% 
N 5,467 5,467 5,467 1,872 3,595 
 
Table 4  (continued) 
Panel B: Sensitivity analyses 
  Cross-listing variables 
Models N PP OTC EXCH Cross-listing  firm 
Alternative dependent variables:      
(1) Bond spreads adjusted for  5,467 -0.302* -0.165 -0.309** 0.061 
 U.S. T-bill rate  (-1.68) (-1.26) (-2.09) (0.56) 
      
(2) Bond spreads adjusted for  5,454 -0.204 -0.085 -0.436*** -0.046 
 local T-bill rate  (-1.21) (-0.58) (-2.94) (-0.41) 
Alternative sample composition:      
(3) Only 300 firm-years from Japan 3,625 -0.150 -0.040 -0.216*** -0.074 
  (-0.90) (-0.28) (-2.58) (-0.67) 
      
(4) Multiple bond issues per year 10,557 -0.276 -0.319** -0.460*** 0.159 
  (-1.46) (-2.46) (-3.32) (1.50) 
      
(5) Including convertible bonds 6,210 -0.246 -0.225* -0.384*** 0.041 
  (-1.55) (-1.73) (-2.81) (0.42) 
Control for endogeneity of U.S. cross-listing:     
(6) Selection model for EXCH  4,678 -0.386** -0.153 -0.408*** -0.008 
 (including inverse Mills ratio)  (-2.22) (-1.13) (-3.01) (-0.08) 
      
(7) Remove two years following  5,200 -0.231 -0.202 -0.260*** -0.075 
 U.S. cross-listing  (-1.35) (-1.31) (-2.80) (-0.72) 
      
(8) Interact cross-listing firm indicator  5,467 -0.641*** -0.066 -0.283* 0.361** 
 with firm-specific controls  (-3.26) (-0.51) (-1.91) (2.43) 
 
The yield-to-maturity sample comprises a maximum of 5,467 firm-year observations from 46 countries between 
1992 and 2012 (see Table 1). In Panel A, we report coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firm from OLS regressions of the costs of debt issuance on firms’ cross-listing 
status and various control variables. The dependent variable is the Bond yield-to-maturity measured at the time of 
the issuance of the bond. For a description of the independent variables see Table 2. We use log transformations 
where indicated, and include country (C), one-digit SIC industry (I), and year (Y) fixed effects in the regressions, 
but do not report the coefficients. Models 1 to 3 use all firm-year observations. In Models 4 and 5 we separately 
analyze the period before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was implemented in 2002. In Panel B, we 
summarize various sensitivity analyses. Unless stated otherwise, we estimate the same specification as in Model 3 of 
Panel A, but only report the cross-listing variables. We conduct the following sensitivity analyses: (1) we use bond 
spreads adjusted for U.S. T-bill rates as the dependent variable, i.e., we subtract the contemporaneous yields of U.S. 
Treasury securities with similar maturity and coupon rates from the bond yield-to-maturity. Consequently, we do not 
include the U.S. T-bill rate and Local T-bill rate variables among the bond-specific controls. (2) Similar to (1), but 
we adjust the bond yield-to-maturity by the contemporaneous yields of government securities in the issuing firm’s 
country of domicile. If no government securities with similar maturity and coupon rates are available, we use short-
term risk-free interest rates instead. (3) We limit the influence of Japan, the largest sample country, to 300 randomly 
selected firm-years. (4) We allow for multiple bond issues in a given year. (5) We include convertible bonds in the 
sample. (6) We include the inverse Mills ratio from a selection model of the U.S. cross-listing decision in the 
regression. That is, we first model EXCH as a function of the percentage of foreign sales (out of total sales revenue), 
the log of market value, financial leverage, tangibility, return on assets, a negative earnings indicator, funding needs, 
the market-to-book ratio, return variability, Altman’s (1968) Z-score, and country and industry fixed effects. We 
then estimate the resulting probit regression separately for each year and compute the corresponding inverse Mills 
ratios. (7) We remove observations from the two years immediately following a U.S. equity cross-listing from the 
sample. (8) We allow for separate relations for ADR and non-ADR firms. That is, we include interaction terms 
between the Cross-listing firm indicator and each of the firm-specific control variables in the model. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Table 5  Analysis of alternative debt (and equity) financing instruments around U.S. equity cross-listings 
Panel A: Changes in propensity of issuance 
 
Model 1 
(Public bonds as  
dependent variable) 
Model 2 
(Private bonds as  
dependent variable) 
Model 3 
(Domestic bonds as  
dependent variable) 
Model 4 
(Foreign bonds as  
dependent variable) 
Model 5 
(Loan issues as  
dependent variable) 
Model 6 
(Equity issues as  
dependent variable) 
Cross-listing variables:       
  PP 0.036 0.128 -0.060 0.220*** 0.142*** 0.189*** 
 (0.60) (1.57) (-0.86) (3.02) (2.79) (4.68) 
  OTC 0.071 0.066 0.040 0.150** 0.010 -0.095*** 
 (1.39) (0.92) (0.69) (2.46) (0.23) (-3.22) 
  EXCH 0.167*** -0.011 -0.238*** 0.438*** 0.125*** -0.039 
 (3.46) (-0.16) (-3.90) (8.07) (2.86) (-1.12) 
  Cross-listing firm 0.261*** 0.161*** 0.252*** 0.256*** 0.169*** 0.095*** 
 (6.14) (2.68) (5.32) (5.18) (4.69) (3.81) 
Debt and equity financing variables:      
  Previous bond issue 1.114*** 0.614*** 1.141*** 0.698*** n.a. n.a. 
 (43.81) (17.17) (44.31) (20.49)   
  Previous loan issue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.924*** n.a. 
     (36.18)  
  Previous equity issue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.515*** 
      (47.47) 
  Bond-issuing firm n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.445*** 0.074*** 
     (21.84) (5.36) 
  Loan-issuing firm 0.438*** 0.442*** 0.516*** 0.364*** n.a. 0.120*** 
 (18.19) (13.48) (19.92) (13.03)  (8.59) 
  Equity-issuing firm 0.071*** 0.134*** 0.053** 0.172*** 0.174*** n.a. 
 (3.33) (4.42) (2.32) (6.29) (9.00)  
Firm-specific controls included included included included included included 
Fixed effects C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y 
Pseudo R2 34.60% 19.84% 34.56% 31.25% 25.73% 16.47% 
N 195,999 192,470 191,211 195,580 195,999 195,999 
 
In Panel A, the sample comprises a maximum of 195,999 firm-year observations from 46 countries between 1992 and 2012 (see Table 1). The panel reports 
coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) z-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm from probit regressions of debt and equity financing on firms’ 
cross-listing status and various control variables. In Models 1 to 4, the dependent variable is a binary indicator for bonds issued in public market offerings 
(Public bonds), private offerings (Private bonds), the firms’ country of domicile (Domestic bonds), or abroad (Foreign bonds) in a given year, respectively. In 
Model 5, the dependent variable is Loan issue set equal to 1 if the firm undertakes a syndicated loan offering. In Model 6, the dependent variable is Equity 
issue set equal to 1 if the firm externally raises shareholders’ equity capital. Model 1 from Table 3 serves as base specification, but we do not report all the 
coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Table 5  (continued) 
Panel B: Changes in cost of issuance 
Bond yield-to-maturity  
as dependent variable 
Model 1 
(Public bonds) 
Model 2 
(Private bonds) 
Model 3 
(Domestic bonds) 
Model 4 
(Foreign bonds)  
Model 5 
(Syndicated loans) 
Loan spreads  
as dependent variable 
Cross-listing variables:       Cross-listing variables: 
  PP -0.316* -0.081 -0.130 -0.299  -0.120 PP   
 (-1.78) (-0.22) (-0.81) (-0.64)  (-0.77)  
  OTC -0.168 0.140 0.116 -0.492*  -0.142 OTC   
 (-1.37) (0.42) (0.99) (-1.77)  (-1.13)  
  EXCH -0.408*** 0.244 -0.225* -0.531**  -0.070 EXCH   
 (-2.85) (0.67) (-1.78) (-2.18)  (-0.52)  
  Cross-listing firm 0.039 -0.117 -0.126 0.352*  0.136   Cross-listing firm   
 (0.40) (-0.37) (-1.22) (1.80)  (1.37)  
Bond-specific variables:      Loan-specific variables: 
  U.S. T-bill rate 0.048 0.167** -0.022 0.306***  0.194*** Log(Loan maturity)   
 (1.10) (2.18) (-0.56) (3.33)  (4.18)  
  Local T-bill rate 0.413*** 0.228*** 0.484*** 0.154**  0.034 Log(Loan size)   
 (8.11) (3.40) (10.27) (2.11)  (1.12)  
  Log(Bond maturity) 0.118* 0.145 0.060 0.514**  -0.183*** Investment grade   
 (1.66) (1.03) (0.96) (2.47)  (-3.62)  
  Log(Bond size) -0.082** -0.178** -0.148*** 0.183**  0.738*** Term loans   
 (-1.96) (-2.40) (-3.89) (2.43)  (9.69)  
  Investment grade -0.179*** -0.543*** -0.187*** -0.808***  -0.049*** Number of lenders   
 (-2.88) (-4.45) (-3.56) (-5.76)  (-10.98)  
  Callable 0.600*** 0.563*** 0.666*** 0.087  -0.094** Previous loan issues   
 (4.39) (3.54) (4.72) (0.60)  (-2.09)  
  Subordinated -0.284 1.443** 0.863 -0.002  -0.108* Performance pricing   
 (-0.64) (2.33) (1.18) (-0.00)  (-1.74)  
  Previous bond issues -0.174*** -0.387*** -0.163*** -0.349***  -0.224*** Revolver   
 (-3.68) (-3.76) (-3.75) (-2.99)  (-3.79)  
Firm-specific & macro-
economic controls included included included included  included 
Firm-specific & macro-
economic controls 
Fixed effects C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y C, I, Y  C, I, Y Fixed effects 
Adj. R2 78.99% 65.47% 81.42% 62.85%  31.13% Adj. R2 
N 4,221 1,246 4,208 1,259   5,200 N 
 
Table 5  (continued) 
In Panel B, the yield-to-maturity sample comprises a maximum of 5,467 firm-year observations from 46 countries between 1992 and 2012 (see Table 1). The 
panel reports coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm from OLS regressions of the costs of debt 
issuance on firms’ cross-listing status and various control variables. In Models 1 to 4, we limit the sample to bonds issued in public market offerings (Public 
bonds), private offerings (Private bonds), the firms’ country of domicile (Domestic bonds), or abroad (Foreign bonds), respectively. Model 3 from Table 4, 
Panel A, serves as base specification, but we do not report all the coefficients. In Model 5, we use Syndicated loan spreads as dependent variable, measured as 
the amount the borrowers pay (including annual fees) over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down. The syndicated loan sample comprises 5,200 firm-year 
observations from 38 countries between 1992 and 2012 for which sufficient loan-specific data from Dealscan and Worldscope financial data exist. We exclude 
financial firms, and require a minimum loan amount of 10 US$ million. We only retain the loan with the largest facility amount per firm-year. We replace the 
bond characteristics with the following loan-specific controls: Loan maturity is measured in months at the date of the issuance. Loan size equals the facility 
amount in US$ million. Investment grade is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan’s credit rating is BBB- or higher by Standard & Poor’s or Baa3 or 
higher by Moody’s. If credit ratings are missing, we compute Altman’s (1968) Z-score, and use 2.675 as cutoff value to assign investment grade status. Term 
loans represents the percentage of individual loans in a loan package (measured using the facility amount) with a specified repayment schedule and a fixed 
maturity. The Number of lenders is the number of participants in the deal syndicate. Previous loan issues indicates the number of previous syndicated loans 
taken by the borrower. Performance pricing and Revolver are indicator variables set equal to 1 if the loan facility uses performance pricing or gets renewed 
automatically upon maturity. We include three Purpose of loan indicator variables marking the repayment of debt, corporate investments, or working capital 
needs, but do not report the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Table 6  Cross-sectional analysis of bond financing around U.S. equity cross-listings 
Panel A: Institutional characteristics by firms’ country of domicile 
Country 
Private benefits  
of control 
(1=large)   
Debt  
enforcement 
(1=high efficiency)   
Importance of 
bond markets 
(1=high) 
Argentina 0.27 (1)  35.8 (0)  0.11 (0) 
Australia 0.02 (0)  87.8 (1)  0.20 (0) 
Austria 0.38 (1)  78.0 (1)  0.32 (1) 
Belgium n.a. n.a.  90.8 (1)  0.96 (1) 
Brazil 0.65 (1)  13.4 (0)  0.39 (1) 
Canada 0.01 (0)  93.2 (1)  0.61 (1) 
Chile 0.18 (1)  40.9 (0)  0.27 (0) 
China n.a. n.a.  43.6 (0)  0.08 (0) 
Colombia 0.27 (1)  64.8 (0)  0.18 (0) 
Czech Republic 0.58 (1)  40.7 (0)  0.40 (1) 
Denmark 0.08 (1)  76.7 (1)  0.52 (1) 
Egypt 0.04 (0)  28.6 (0)  n.a. n.a. 
Finland 0.02 (0)  92.4 (1)  0.34 (1) 
France 0.02 (0)  54.1 (0)  0.45 (1) 
Germany 0.10 (1)  57.0 (0)  0.32 (1) 
Greece n.a. n.a.  53.8 (0)  0.62 (1) 
Hong Kong 0.00 (0)  88.3 (1)  0.09 (0) 
India n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a.  0.23 (0) 
Indonesia 0.07 (0)  25.1 (0)  0.18 (0) 
Ireland n.a. n.a.  89.9 (1)  0.24 (0) 
Israel 0.27 (1)  66.2 (0)  n.a. n.a. 
Italy 0.37 (1)  45.3 (0)  0.86 (1) 
Japan -0.04 (0)  95.5 (1)  0.79 (1) 
Korea (South) 0.16 (1)  88.1 (1)  0.21 (0) 
Malaysia 0.07 (0)  48.4 (0)  0.36 (1) 
Mexico 0.34 (1)  72.6 (1)  0.13 (0) 
The Netherlands 0.02 (0)  94.9 (1)  0.44 (1) 
New Zealand 0.03 (0)  90.7 (1)  0.29 (0) 
Norway 0.01 (0)  91.8 (1)  0.17 (0) 
Pakistan n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a.  0.36 (1) 
Peru 0.14 (1)  41.8 (0)  0.08 (0) 
Philippines 0.13 (1)  17.5 (0)  0.33 (1) 
Poland 0.13 (1)  67.7 (1)  0.26 (0) 
Portugal 0.20 (1)  82.3 (1)  0.38 (1) 
Russia n.a. n.a.  39.0 (0)  0.03 (0) 
Singapore 0.03 (0)  96.1 (1)  0.25 (0) 
South Africa 0.02 (0)  39.8 (0)  0.39 (1) 
Spain 0.04 (0)  82.0 (1)  0.43 (1) 
Sri Lanka n.a. n.a.  45.7 (0)  n.a. n.a. 
Sweden 0.07 (0)  86.0 (1)  0.43 (1) 
Switzerland 0.06 (0)  60.4 (0)  0.23 (0) 
Taiwan 0.00 (0)  93.8 (1)  0.14 (0) 
Thailand 0.12 (1)  54.9 (0)  0.14 (0) 
Turkey 0.37 (1)  6.6 (0)  0.18 (0) 
United Arab Emirates n.a. n.a.  21.8 (0)  n.a. n.a. 
United Kingdom 0.01 (0)  92.3 (1)  0.32 (1) 
 
Panel A presents raw values and (in parentheses) binary indicators of the country-level variables used to partition the 
sample into two. We split the institutional variables by the sample median. Private benefits of control is taken from 
Dyck and Zingales (2004) and represents the mean price premium paid for the acquisition of a controlling block. 
Higher values stand for larger control benefits. We use the Djankov et al. (2008) Debt enforcement score, measured 
as the discounted terminal value of a typical firm after bankruptcy costs (in percent of firm value). Higher values 
stand for countries with more efficient debt enforcement. We measure the Importance of bond markets in a country 
as the aggregate market capitalization of public bonds in percent of GDP (source: World Bank). We tabulate sample 
period means. Higher values indicate countries with relatively more important bond markets. 
 
 
 Table 6  (continued) 
 
Private benefits of control  Debt enforcement  Importance of bond markets 
Model 1 
(small) 
Model 2 
(large)   
Model 3 
(low efficiency) 
Model 4 
(high efficiency)   
Model 5 
(low) 
Model 6 
(high) 
Panel B: Changes in propensity of bond financing conditional on firms’ country of domicile (Bond issue as dependent variable) 
Cross-listing variables:         
  PP 0.094 0.263***  0.024 0.225***  0.145** 0.141 
 (0.97) (2.97)  (0.19) (3.53)  (2.06) (1.04) 
  OTC 0.034 -0.039  0.002 0.083  -0.089 0.136** 
 (0.61) (-0.44)  (0.02) (1.53)  (-1.09) (2.43) 
  EXCH 0.131*** 0.154  0.109 0.157***  0.102 0.148*** 
 (2.80) (1.54)  (1.24) (3.13)  (1.20) (2.96) 
Debt and equity  
financing & firm-
specific controls 
included included  included included  included included 
Fixed effects C, I, Y C, I, Y  C, I, Y C, I, Y  C, I, Y C, I, Y 
Pseudo R2 33.79% 37.60%  32.12% 34.64%  31.27% 35.56% 
N 128,192 39,060   62,467 125,353   85,570 108,217 
Panel C: Changes in cost of bond financing conditional on firms’ country of domicile (Bond yield-to-maturity as dependent variable) 
Cross-listing variables:         
  PP -0.104 -0.194  -0.487 -0.138  -0.187 -0.152 
 (-0.40) (-0.65)  (-1.42) (-0.76)  (-0.89) (-0.30) 
  OTC -0.208 -0.096  -0.152 -0.172  -0.511* -0.024 
 (-1.59) (-0.24)  (-0.59) (-1.18)  (-1.71) (-0.18) 
  EXCH -0.423*** -0.233  -0.175 -0.467***  -0.035 -0.395** 
 (-2.70) (-0.68)  (-0.60) (-2.95)  (-0.14) (-2.43) 
Bond-specific, firm-
specific & macro- 
economic controls  
included included  included included  included included 
Fixed effects C, I, Y C, I, Y  C, I, Y C, I, Y  C, I, Y C, I, Y 
Adj. R2 74.84% 45.30%  45.51% 75.31%  62.96% 75.79% 
N 3,747 1,182   1,096 4,122   1,981 3,485 
 
The sample comprises a maximum of 195,999 firm-year observations from 46 countries between 1992 and 2012, of which 5,467 have bond yield-to maturity 
data (see Table 1). We tabulate results separately for subsets of sample countries based on the binary partitioning variables outlined in Panel A. In Panel B, we 
report coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) z-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm from probit regressions of debt financing on firms’ 
cross-listing status and various controls. The dependent variable is Bond issue set equal to 1 if the firm undertakes a public or private bond offering. Model 1 
from Table 3 serves as base specification. In Panel C, we report coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firm from OLS regressions of the costs of debt issuance on firms’ cross-listing status and various controls. The dependent variable is the Bond yield-to-
maturity measured at the time of issuance. Model 3 from Table 4, Panel A, serves as base specification. We only tabulate the main variables of interest. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
